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INTRODUCTION

ONCE MORE UNTO THE BREACH:
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT SCHOLARSHIP
AND THE COURT
James E. Pfander*
It is the inheritedwisdom of the American bar that responsibleprofessional comment and criticism are the principalrestraintsuponjudicial arbitrariness at the highest level and major influences in the continuing
development of court-made law. If there is one legal development.., which
would cause the most credulous observer to doubt the truth of this axiom, it is
the continued good health of the doctrine of sovereign immunity....
[Llearned members of the legal profession have been continuously attacking
the roots and branches of that judicially planted growth....

But...

criticism seems to have confirmed the Court in the error of its ways.
-[Professor] Antonin Scalia (1970)1

Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. My thanks go to the
editors of the Notre Dame Law Review for agreeing to take on the editorial challenges
of this Symposium issue and to do so with an outlander like myself. The contributions
published here include those (by Judge Fletcher and Professors Vdzquez,
Woolhander, and Jackson) that were given to the annual meeting of the Federal
Courts Section of the Association of American Law Schools in January 2000 and an
additional collection of commentaries from a variety of distinguished scholars. For
thoughtful comments on a draft of this introductory Essay, I thank VickiJackson, Dan
Meltzer, and Jay Tidmarsh. For the title, my thanks to William Shakespeare, The
Tragedy of King Henry the Fifth, act III, scene i ("Once more unto the breach, dear
friends.").
*

1 Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrative Action: Some Conclusionsfrom the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MicH. L. REv. 867, 867-68
(1970) (citations omitted) (discussing the federal government's sovereign immunity
from suit in its own courts).
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INTRODUCTION

One has to admire the gumption of the editors of the Notre Dame
Law Review for their agreement to publish these comments on recent
developments in state sovereign immunity. For in the thirty years
since then-Professor Antonin Scalia called attention to the Supreme
Court's imperviousness to such criticism in a somewhat different context, academic writing has had little obvious influence on the Court' s
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. 2 In the decision that remains a
decisive turning point in its new law of state sovereign immunity, Seminole Tribe v. Floida,3 the Court revealed a measure of its disdain.
Speaking through the ChiefJustice, the majority belittled the dissent's
account of the origins of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment as a "theory cobbled together from law review articles."'4
In the face of such a courtly dismissal, one could forgive the editors
and publishers of the offending material if they were to decide simply
to change the subject.
Happily, to my way of thinking at least, the editors of the Review
and the contributors to this Symposium have not abandoned the
(somewhat one-sided) conversation. Prepared in connection with the
January 2000 meeting of the Federal Courts Section of the Association
of American Law Schools (AALS), the contributions to this Sympo2 To be sure, it did appear for a moment in the 1980s that some version of the
diversity account of the 11th Amendment, perhaps coupled with abrogation, might
emerge from the Court. On the diversity explanation of the 11th Amendment, see
William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdictionRather Than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983), and John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983). On abrogation, see John E. Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes of Action
Against State Government and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLUM L. REv. 1413 (1975). For the impact of such scholarship on a closely divided
Court, see Atascadero State Hospitalv. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 261-87 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (arguing for the adoption of the diversity explanation of the 11th
Amendment), and Welch v. Texas Department of Highways, 483 U.S. 468, 496 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing a reluctance to reconsider Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890), in light of the diversity explanation without further briefing, leaving
open the possibility that he might adopt the diversity view in a subsequent case). Ultimately, however, Justice Scaliajoined the dissenters in Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (rejecting the diversity account of the I Ith Amendment, declining to reconsider Hans,and rejecting the notion of congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity other than pursuant to the 14th Amendment), and the Court has
steadily marched away from the scholarly consensus ever since. Increasingly, moreover, it appears to me that scholars have begun to march along.
3 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
4 Seminole Tibe, 517 U.S. at 68-69.
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sium address issues relating to sovereign immunity in general and to
the three most recent decisions of the Supreme Court in particular.
The decisions, Alden v. Maine,5 FloridaPrepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,6 and College Savings Bank v. Florida PrepaidPostsecondary Education Expense Board,7 arrived on the last
day of the 1998 Term. By an identical 5-4 vote in each case, the
Court's majority continued to extend its judge-made doctrine of state
sovereign immunity and to surprise and confound academic observers.8 The willingness of editors and contributors alike to go forward
with this Symposium evidences some continuing faith in the possibility
that responsible professional comment and criticism may yet, in the
words of Antonin Scalia, restrain judicial arbitrariness at the highest
level.
I, too, remain hopeful, as I explain in this Introduction to the
Symposium. To be sure, one must acknowledge (as I do in Part II of
this Introduction) the somewhat pessimistic reality that Alden represents a challenge to much of the existing learning in the field. Before
Alden, one might have argued that Eleventh Amendment law offered
some parameters, within which the Court would move as it continued
to work out the implications of its decision in Seminole Tribe. But Alden
breaks through those parameters and raises questions as to the ability
of prior decisional law to explain or to constrain the Court's expanding conception of state sovereign immunity. Part III begins the
task of trying to account for the factors that may underlie the Court's
evolving doctrine and to suggest new areas of inquiry. Part IV continues the task of picking up after Alden by surveying the important contributions of the participants in this Symposium. In these
contributions, I find reason to hope that Eleventh Amendment scholarship may yet explain, even if it fails to broaden, the Court's narrow
conception of state suability.
II.

AzDENAND THE DEMISE

OF THE ELEvENm AMENDM-NT VERITIES

Eleventh Amendment scholarship has tended to regard the problem of enforcing state compliance with federal law as something that,
though nettlesome, remained well within the capacity of the well-rep5 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
6 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
7 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
8 The three decisions will no doubt occasion a good deal of comment. In addition to this one, the law reviews at Rutgers-Camden and Loyola of Los Angeles have
symposia in the works that will take up the immunity trilogy.
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resented litigant. 9 To be sure, blackletter law held that states may not
be named as defendants in suits brought before the federal district
courts. 10 But a variety of ways around the Eleventh Amendment were
available. The enterprising litigant might have sued the responsible
state official and secured either prospective injunctive relief'" or an
award of damages running not against the state as such, but against
the state officers in their personal capacities. 12 In addition, Congress
enjoyed some measure of authority to allow individuals actually to sue
the state itself in certain circumstances.' 3 Finally, the Court itself remained open to review decisions of the state courts that rejected federal-law claims against states that originated in state court. 14 The array
of available remedial options suggested to some observers that the
Eleventh Amendment did not much matter, certainly not to the enforcement of rights based upon constitutional law1 5 and little enough
to the enforcement of federal statutes.
Alden undermines this irrelevance thesis and suggests instead that
remedial options once thought secure may themselves quickly become obsolete. In this Section, I will briefly summarize the way in
which Alden and its companion cases undermine the assumptions surrounding the enforcement of federal law against the states.
9 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries,Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983,
84 VA. L. REV. 47, 81 (1998) (describing as "vanishingly small" the area where the 11th
Amendment bars all relief against states).
10 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
11 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding that the l1th Amendment does not bar prospective relief from continuing violation of federal statutory
rights); ExParteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that l1th Amendment does not
forbid application for order enjoining state officer from violation of individual's due
process rights under the 14th Amendment).
12 See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1991) (reaffirming the amenability
of state officers to suit for damages and specifically rejecting any llth Amendment
immunity for such officers). Officials enjoy immunity from liability except where they
violate "clearly established" constitutional rights. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 639-40 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
13 Congress may abrogate the immunity of the states acting pursuant to its enforcement powers under the 14th Amendment, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976), but only if it effects such abrogation in a clear statutory text, see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985).
14 See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18,
27 (1990) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 412 (1821)).
15 See David P. Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547
(1997) (proclaiming Ex Parte Young "alive and well"); Jeffries, supra note 9, at 49-54
(arguing that alternative remedies substitute for suits for damages brought against the
states as such); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARv.
L. REV. 102 (1996) (suggesting that the Court's extension of sovereign immunity will
have little real impact on federal right enforcement).
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The Utter Irrelevance of the Text

The Court has long since abandoned any arguments based upon
the text of the Eleventh Amendment, admitting in Seminole Tribe that
the text alone would support what has come to be known (in the cobbled-together world of the law reviews) as the "diversity" theory.' 6 Alden underscored the irrelevance of the text and did much to cut the
Court loose entirely from any purposive approach to its interpretation. For in Alden, the Court held that the principle of sovereign immunity that underlies the Amendment operates as a bar to suits
brought in state court. 17 The mere text, of course, mentions only the
'Judicial power of the United States"' 8 and had long been understood
to apply in accordance with its terms only to suits in federal courts.' 9
The Court achieved its result by transforming its rule of state sovereign immunity into an implicit restriction on the power of Congress
under Article I of the Constitution. Alden's version of state sovereign
immunity owes as much to the process federalism of New York v. United
States20 and Printz v. United States2 ' as to earlier decisions on the scope
of the Eleventh Amendment.
B. History Transformed
In the process of transforming the judicial-power focus of the
Eleventh Amendment into a restriction on congressional power, the
Court has reversed the assumptions that appear to have informed the
framing of Article ]I and the Eleventh Amendment. Although the
Federalists may well have assumed the states' immunity from suit in
their own courts during the 1790s, they responded by seeking to as16 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2254 (1999) (quoting Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)) (stating that the "text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversityjurisdiction"). For a review of the diversity
explanation and its critics, see James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatoy" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1269 (1998).
17 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246-47 (describing state immunity as a fundamental
attribute of sovereignty as of the time of the framing).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
19 See, e.g., Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204-05
(1991); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1989); Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 418-21 (1979).
20 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not compel state legislatures
into enacting federal rules into state law).
21 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not compel state executive
branch officials to enforce or administer a federal regulatory program).
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sure the availability of a federal enforcement docket. 22 Inadequate
state enforcement thus required a federal solution. In the century just
past, the trend among the states has been to abandon sovereign immunity in their own courts, even as the Supreme Court steadily expanded the Eleventh Amendment as a barrier to the enforcement of
federal rights in federal court. Curiously, in light of the steady disappearance of sovereign immunity in other contexts, Alden builds upon
the absence of federal judicial power to support an extension of state
immunity to state courts as well. 2 3 Instead of seeing the federal courts

as a solution to non-suability in state court (as the framers did),24 the
Court has relied upon its own doctrine of immunity in federal court to
justify restrictions on state court proceedings, restrictions that go beyond what the states have ordinarily provided themselves in suits
25
based upon state law.

C.

The Absence of CongressionalAuthority

Past decisions had given some reason to hope that Congress
might retain ultimate control over the extent of state sovereign immu22 If the framers of Article III did not expect the states to open their courts to
suits brought against the state itself, they certainly believed that the states should be
responsible to individuals for breach of their federal obligations. Distrust of the willingness of state legislatures to authorize state court adjudication goes a long way to
explain why Article III explicitly provides for the adjudication of suits against the
states and why the framers gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over such
matters. See James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's OriginalJurisdictionin
State-PartyCases, 82 CAL. L. REv. 555, 593-94 (1994) [hereinafter Pfander, Rethinking].
The 11th Amendment trimmed the judicial power in part, by denying all federal
courts jurisdiction over suits to enforce obligations based upon common law tort and
contract claims by diverse plaintiffs and aliens. See Pfander, supra note 16, at 1380-82
(arguing that the history of the 11 th Amendment confirms its application to diversitybased, but not federal question, claims against the states). It thus leaves the states
with a measure of control over how to structure the enforcement of state law claims
against the state, and most states have chosen in large measure to abandon sovereign
immunity. See James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity:
FederalAppellate CourtReview of State-CourtJudgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L.
REv. 161, 205-10 (1998) [hereinafter Pfander, An IntermediateSolution] (summarizing
the wide array of state laws that waive sovereign immunity and provide for determination of money claims in state court).
23 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266 (emphasizing the absence of federal judicial power
over suits against states as an argument for extending the immunity to state courts as
well).
24 See supra note 22.
25 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268 (upholding the right of Maine to waive its immunity from suit on claims based upon state law and to retain immunity as to analogous
federal claims and finding no improper discrimination against federal rights).
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nity. In Seminole Tribe, for example, the Court appeared to leave Congress in charge of the vitality of the Ex Parte Young action in suits to
enforce federal statutory rights prospectively. 26 The decision also
hinted, somewhat ambiguously to be sure, that Congress might allow
individuals to pursue retrospective relief in state court.2 7 Such hints
found support in the Court's indication in other decisions that it did
not intend to revisit decisions that blocked, on Tenth Amendment
grounds, the power of Congress to regulate the states as states. 28 One

might have supposed that the power of Congress to fashion such a
right of action would have carried with it the power to specify a remedy in damages for its violation. But Alden holds that something im-

plicit in the Constitution bars Congress from fashioning such a

remedy.
D.

The Argument from Novelty

With its invocation of remedial options to prove its irrelevance

thesis, the Alden Court observed that it was facing the question of suits
in state court dealing with federal rights of action for the first time in
26 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) (concluding that congressional prescription of a detailed remedial scheme displaced the availability of an
officer suit enforcement through reliance upon the Ex Parte Young exception to the
11th Amendment). For criticisms of this portion of Seminole Tribe, see Currie, supra
note 15, at 550 (arguing that the Court's decision to foreclose suit against the state
left no detailed remedial scheme intact to displace the otherwise presumptive availability of the Ex Parte Young remedy against the state official and describing the provision for suit against the state as unavailable to displace the officer suit under Ex Parte
Young), Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment and the PotentialEvisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 495, 534 (1997) (same), and Daniel J.
Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. CT. RFv. 1, 47
(same).
27 See Pfander, An Intermediate Solution, supra note 22, at 183-87 (suggesting that
the Seminole Tribe Court's rejection of an officer suit under Ex Parte Young might rest
upon the presumed availability of a suit against the state in state court). Of course,
the decision in Alden forecloses suits in state court and leaves the Ex Parte Young section of Seminole Tribe wholly indefensible against the criticisms of Professors Meltzer,
Jackson, and Currie.
28 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (taking care to distinguish Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Sanitary District, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
Although Alden does not cite Garcia,it does note that the United States may bring a
suit for back wages to the enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act, see Alden, 119 S. Ct. at
2267 (noting the inapplicability of the 11th Amendment to suits brought by the
United States), and thus assumes that Congress has the power to fashion a right of
action against the state. Cf Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000) (upholding the
power of Congress to regulate state driver licensing agencies as part of a statute regulating commerce in information drawn from such licenses).
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210 years of constitutional history. The sheer novelty of the question
suggested that "a federal power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits in their own courts is unnecessary to uphold the Constitution and valid federal statutes as the supreme law."2 9 Similar

arguments from novelty have been a staple of the Court's recent federalism decisions. 30 Such arguments convey the message that the issue cannot be of great importance to the scope of congressional
remedial authority or it would have arisen long ago. They also suggest
that a decision to deny effect to an act of Congress on constitutional
grounds will occasion no great disruption of the established order.
They finally suggest that past Congresses must have consciously refrained from overstepping well-understood constitutional boundaries
and that the legislation under review represents a novel congressional
encroachment upon such settled rules.
E.

The Irrelevance of the State's Obligation of Non-Discrimination

Past decisions had clearly suggested that the states, even if they
may have had no affirmative obligation to open their courts to federal
claims, were at least obliged to refrain from discriminating against the
enforcement of federal claims. 3 1 As a consequence, the Court had
held that the states could not close their doors to a federal right of
action if they were willing to entertain an analogous state cause of
action. 2 It might have appeared to follow that, in cases where the
Eleventh Amendment operated as a barrier to enforcement in federal
courts, the states' obligation to open their courts on a non-discriminatory basis would apply with special force.
Not so. The Alden Court held that the state courts were free to
refuse to hear suits for the enforcement of a federal claim for
backpay, even though they were obliged by state law to hear suits for
29 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2240-68 (1999).
30 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1998) (describing the persuasive force of recent congressional enactments as "outweighed by almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice"); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at
71 (chiding the dissent for ignoring "the fact that the Nation survived for nearly two
centuries without the question of the existence of such power ever being presented to
this Court"); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (describing the
federal statute under review as "unique" in offering the state "no option other than
that of implementing legislation enacted by Congress"); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 40 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the absence of Supreme
Court authority upholding or even identifying an instance of congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity "over the past 200 years" and describing as "strange"
this absence of reliance upon such "useful" an authority).
31 See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
32 See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 207 (1991).
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the enforcement of a similar state claim.38 The Court dismissed its
non-discrimination principle as irrelevant and concluded that the
state was free to invoke its constitutional immunity from suit in a selective manner that burdens the enforcement of federal rights.
F.

The New Relevance of Policy Arguments

Professor David Currie has described the doctrine of sovereign
immunity as a "deplorable" but unavoidable feature of our constitutional system.3 4 No similar measure of regret informs the Court's decision to extend state sovereign immunity.3 5 Indeed, Alden suggests that
state sovereign immunity might make good sense, operating as a kind
of insurance policy to protect the state fisc from the imposition of
excessive damages awards.3 6 Such policy justifications pose a further
threat to rule-of-law values-the fisc-protection policy has no obvious
stopping point as one moves from rights grounded in congressional
regulation of commerce to those grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment or other constitutional provisions. The invocation of policy sows
the seeds of further doctrinal growth and may give rise to confusion
37
below.
33 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268 (rejecting claim of discrimination against federal
right of action and applying a standard of "systematic fashion to discriminate" against
federal rights that appears nowhere in prior cases and leaves states free to selectively
refuse enforcement to federal causes of action).
34 See Currie, supra note 15, at 548.
35 One can find the faint tone of regret, however muted, in the Court's efforts to
remind parties that other modes of securing relief remain available. See Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 71 n.14 (emphasizing "other methods of ensuring the States' compliance
with federal law"); cf. Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 273-74 (1997)
(plurality opinion) (describing the Court's l1th Amendmentjurisprudence in terms
of a balance between state immunity and federal supremacy and treating availability
of state court remedies as a decisive factor in the balance); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105-06 (1984) (describing the need to balance "the
supremacy of federal law" against the "constitutional immunity of the States" and concluding that the balance tipped in favor of immunity in suits based upon state law).
The Alden Court adverts to the Pennhurstbalancing test and the need to assure federal
supremacy, but its portrait of sovereign immunity as a positive good may portend
further expansions to come.
36 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264 (noting that suits for money damages may threaten
the financial integrity of the state and, when instituted through an act of Congress,
may place an "unwarranted strain" on the ability of the states to govern in accordance
with the will of their citizens).
37 In my judgment, the right of private suitors to bring actions for injunctive relief to enforce rights under federal statutes-particularly those that create a liability
that runs against states and may be enforced in suits brought by the federal government-represents a likely future casualty of expanding state sovereign immunity.
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DIRECTIONS IN ELEVENTH AMENDMENT SCHOLARSHIP

With the Court's turn away from the prior learning and its resistance to academic criticism, perhaps it will see little virtue in the development of a broader agenda for research in the area of sovereign
immunity. But scholars should work as much to understand as to persuade, and we have much to learn about what motivates the Justices in
the majority. In this Part, I will hazard a few guesses on the subject
and consider what might lie ahead for academics interested in studying the growth of state sovereignty.
A.

Accountingfor the Revival of Sovereign Immunity

Among other puzzles, we need to account for the Court's stubborn insistence on reviving and extending sovereign immunity-a
doctrine that everywhere else appears to have largely disappeared.3 8
Twenty-five years ago, it appeared sensible to say that sovereign immunity was simply a matter of judge-made common law that Congress
might well override. 39 The doctrine has bulked up considerably since
then, and we need to learn why.
1. The Failure of the Political Safeguards
Much of what the Court has done in the past two decades can be
seen as predicated upon the assumption that Congress, when pressed,
would decline to create federal statutory liability running directly
against the states. The Court has created a variety of clear-statement
rules, each of which frustrated the apparent goals of a particular remedial scheme, but which could have been said to serve the larger
40
interest in energizing state political opposition to future legislation.
Perhaps to the Court's surprise, such state opposition, if indeed it has
arisen, has failed to prevent the passage of a new series of statutes,
each more detailed than the past, that provides for the abrogation of
state sovereign immunity. In recent years, the Court has faced clear
38 On the disappearance of sovereign immunity from the world of international
commerce, see Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and
ConstitutionalCompromise, 52 RuTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2000) (noting the distinction
in foreign sovereign immunity law between the nation's public acts and those that are
of a private, commercial nature).
39 See Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 538-40 (1978).
40 For evidence of a link between clear-statement rules and the political safeguards of federalism, see Ann Althouse, EnforcingFederalismAfter United States v. Lopez, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 793, 809 (1996) (linking clear statement requirements to the
political safeguards).
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abrogations of state immunity in federal environmental, 4 1 bankruptcy, 42 intellectual property,4 3 labor protective, 44 and Indian affairs

legislation. 45 Although the changing role of the states in commercial
activities may help to explain these statutes, the Court may perceive
their adoption as evidence of the failure of the political safeguards
46
and of the need for expanded constitutional protection.

2.

The Court's Desire to Calibrate Remedial Potency

What with its worries about the political safeguards and the need
for clear statements, the Court has led Congress on a merry chase
these past several years. 47 Perhaps the cycle of legislative action followed by ever more demanding clear-statement requirements reflects
a judicial preference for retaining control over what one might call
the potency of the remedial scheme. Such a preference appears curiously out of phase with the Court's own insistence on legislative pri41 See Union Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania, 491 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1989) (concluding that
federal super-fund legislation clearly contemplated the recovery of clean-up costs in
suits brought against the states).
42 See S. Elizabeth Gibson, Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy: The Next Chapter,70
Am. BANY.R. L.J. 195 (1996) (describing Congress's decision to abrogate state immunity from suit in bankruptcy).
43 On the clarity of the abrogations of state immunity from suits to enforce patent
and copyright laws, see College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondary Education
Expense Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999), and F/orida PrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) and.
44 SeeAlden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999) (addressing the constitutionality of Congress's decision in the Fair Labor Standards Act to authorize private actions
against states in their own courts).
45 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that Indian
gaming regulatory act satisfied clear-statement requirement).
46 For similar suggestions, see Althouse, supra note 40, at 812-22 (arguing that
the Court's invigoration of sovereigu immunity safeguards seeks to give both state and
federal legislatures a chance to demonstrate a capacity for legislation that respects the
interests of the other body), andJackson, supra note 38 (ascribing the Court's expansion of sovereign immunity to mistrust of Congress).
47 Consider, for example, the history of the Fair Labor Standards Act itself. Congress first extended the Act to cover public-sector employees in 1966. See Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 102(a), 80 Star. 830, 831 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)). The Court subsequently ruled that the statute failed to specify the suability of state governments with the requisite clarity to
support a conclusion that the states had consented to such suits. See Employees of the
Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279
(1973). Following the adoption of the requisite statutory clarification in 1974, the
Court ruled that Congress lacked power under the 10th Amendment to regulate the
states as states. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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macy in the creation of private rights of action but may help to
account for its hostility to legislative provisions for suits for money
48
damages.
In a simpler day, it might have appeared that the role of Congress
was limited to the enunciation of rights and the task of the federal
courts, working within the assumptions of the common law, was to
secure their enforcement. We inherited a common-law presumption
that the courts were to secure, through some appropriate means, the
enforcement of any rights that the legislature chose to fashion (within
constitutional limits).49 One can see the world of innovative judicial
enforcement reflected in such old standards as Osbom v. Bank of the
United States5° and in the presumptive availability of actions in debt to
enforce penal statutes. 5 1 Some judicial control of the contours of
available relief inhered in such a system of legislative minimalism.
Throughout the century just ended, the Court pushed to secure
alternative foundations for much that was previously the province of
the judge-made common law. The Erie doctrine not only banished
48

On the Court's reluctance to recognize implied causes of action, see RICHARD

L. FALLON ET AL. HART & WESCHLER's FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

840-41 (4th ed. 1996). To be sure, the rights of action placed in Congress's keeping
under such an approach run primarily against private defendants, rather than state
actors. Moreover, the availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) may help to secure enforcement of federal statutes against state and local governments to some extent. See
id. at 1133-37 (describing use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) as a remedy for the violation
of other federal statutes). But the Court's emphasis on Congress's primacy in prescribing remedial rules at least raises a question about its unwillingness to defer to
Congress in connection with the need for damages liability to enforce certain rights
against the states.
49 For the historic linkage of rights and remedies, see 3 WILLIAM BLACCSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *23 ("[Where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy."),
quoted in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (equating rights and
remedies), and in Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425
(1987). For doubts that the Constitution compels the right-remedy equation, see
John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE LJ. 87
(1999).

50 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). In Osbon, ChiefJustice Marshall massaged the
rules of injunctive relief to secure its availability in a suit against the officers of the
state. See id. at 838-46 (rejecting Ohio's claim that only those banks with exclusive
charters could seek to enjoin a trespass).
51 SeeJoHN COMYN, 1 A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 225 (1785) (noting that
"[u]pon every statute, made for the Remedy of any Injury, Mischief, or Grievance, an
Action lies by the Party grieved, either by the express Words of the Statute, or by
Implication"). This rule of presumptive enforcement has given way to a rule that
federal courts should generally refrain from enforcing rights unless Congress has created an explicit right of action. SeeERwiN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDIGnON 380-81
(3d ed. 1999).
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general common law in diversity but also threatened the judicial con52
trol of remedial potency in the realm of officer suit litigation. The
Court's doctrine of official immunity placed federal officers beyond
the reach of common law rights of action; 53 its doctrine of sovereign
immunity shielded state actors from the enforcement of state common law restrictions in federal court.54 The Court's hostility to implied rights of action, which has grown in recent years, requires
Congress to speak clearly to bring the federal courts' remedial authority into play.5 5 All of these developments have contributed to what
Judge Guido Calabresi called, in a different context, the "statutorifica56
tion" of the law.
With the rise of statutes and the Court's own insistence that Congress take the lead in fashioning remedial details may come a corresponding reduction in the power of the Court to tailor judicial
remedies in accordance with its own conception of the significance of
the right in question. One can perhaps see some attempt on the
Court's part to recover a power ofjudicial tailoring in its continuing,
if somewhat half-hearted, willingness to allow Congress to abrogate
state immunity in statutes enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.57 The political salience of the rights in question may explain,
52 SeeJames E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition:Toward a First
Amendment Right to PursueJudicialClaimsAgainst the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 899,
977-78 n.294 (1997) (linking Erie and the demise of general federal common law to
the decision in Bivens to fashion a new federal right of action based upon the interpretation of the Constitution).
53 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 495 (1978) (distinguishing between federal officer's absolute immunity from suit for damages flowing from a common law
tort based upon state law and such officer's qualified immunity from suits based upon

federal statutory or constitutional violations).
54 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (applying
the l1th Amendment as a bar to the prospective enforcement of state law limits on
the conduct of state actors).
55 See CHMmERiNsIy, supra note 49, at 380-81 (3d ed. 1999) (describing the
Court's adoption of rules for the implication of private rights of action that emphasize
separation-of-powers concerns and the need to protect the primacy of Congress in
creating the right of action).
56 See GUIDo CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
57 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (upholding the power of Congress
to create a right of action running directly against the state and enforceable in federal
court in the exercise of its powers under the 14th Amendment); cf. Alden v. Maine,
119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999) (reaffirming Fitzpatrick as the product of the exercise of
congressional abrogation power under the 14th Amendment). One can see the halfhearted quality of the Court's commitment to abrogation authority under the 14th
Amendment in decisions that narrow the scope of congressional power and carefully

scrutinize the justifications that Congress offers in effecting an abrogation. See Kimel
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (holding that Congress lacks power to
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in part, the Court's willingness to afford Congress a broader power of
abrogation in that setting than in the more consistently controversial
realm of Commerce Clause regulation.
3.

The Influence of Tort Reform

Tort reform may help to explain the Court's new attitude toward
state suability. Tort reformers worry that the civil liability system in
this country has run amok, resulting in extravagant awards from gullible juries. The Court has considered a number of questions in recent
years that reflect concerns broadly related to tort reform. 58 One
might suppose that the Court's desire to shield the states from the
burden of defending what the Court may view as potentially ruinous
suits for damages might help to explain recent developments. Alden
itself emphasizes the policy of protecting the state fisc and suggests a
kind of insurance rationale for the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.5 9 Moreover, the Court's recent decisions appear to preserve at
least some measure of state suability in actions for injunctive and deabrogate state immunity to secure enforcement of rights to freedom from age discrimination and applying the test of congruence and proprotionality in City of Boerne
v. Flores,521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks power under
the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause to enforce patent rights against the states
and that there was no evidence of unremedied state violations sufficient to support
congressional action). The absence of any congressional power to expand the scope
of rights that individuals hold against the state beyond those specified in the Court's
own decisions interpreting the 14th Amendment have suggested to some observers
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) itself may have become superfluous on the theory that
individuals enjoy a constitutional right to enforce the Constitution against the statesa right that Congress can neither expand nor contract. If so, then we have traveled
quite some distance from the days when the conservative wing of the Court dissented
from the decision in Bivens on the basis that Congress had failed to provide for suits
against federal officers. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 427-28 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that while
Congress could enact laws to provide for suits against federal officers for the violation
of constitutional rights, its failure to have done so precluded the Court from recognizing a right of action as implicit in the Fourth Amendment.) Instead of arguing for
deference to congressional guidance, the Court now appears to view that guidance as
largely irrelevant.
58 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2302 (1999) (reasserting a
call for a national legislative solution to the "elephantine mass of asbestos cases");
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (concluding that federal regulation of
medical devices does not pre-empt personal injury claims under state tort law); BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding that due process limits
the extent of state punitive damages awards).
59 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264 (asserting that suits for money damages may
"threaten the financial integrity of the States").
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claratory relief, even as they foreclose suits for damages. 60 The selective foreclosure of suits for damages may reflect a concern with deep
pockets, runaway juries, and sizable awards.
4. The Court's Worries About State Competence
Court watchers have long rated those who appear on behalf of
state and local governments as among the least accomplished advocates to the Court. 61 This tradition of inadequate advocacy, though
no doubt ameliorated by the amicus briefs of the State and Local
Legal Center, may have subtly persuaded the Justices that the taxpayers who underwrite the costs of state and local governments need protection from the financial consequences of official ineptitude. In
contrast to the attorneys who represent private interests before the
Court and who subtly enforce the notion that firms can conform their
conduct to the law and avoid unexpected liability, the attorneys who
appear for state and local governments may send a message of needed
62
protection.

60 See Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part) (joining plurality opinion in finding an l1th Amendment barrier
to officer suit for injunctive relief to challenge state ownership of submerged lands
but reaffirming the general availability of injunctive relief to foreclose ongoing violations of federal law); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) (refusing to
permit action for injunctive relief against state officer but basing decision on interpretation of statute that Congress was free to amend).
61 See Douglas Ross & Michael W. Catalano, How State and Local Government Fared
in the United States Supreme Courtfor the Past Five Terms, 20 URn. LAw 341, 341 (1988).
For an account of efforts to improve state representation in the Supreme Court, including efforts to "develop in-depth moot court and brief writing programs and efforts to coordinate amicus curiae activity of states," ultimately culminating in the
creation of the State and Local Legal Center "to advance and defend the interests of
state and local government within the federal system," see Lee Epstein, Interest Group
LitigationDuring the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L. & POL. 639, 670-71 (1993) (quoting
Ross & Catalano, supra, at 342).
62 Cf Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor'sNew Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 556-57 (1967) (suggesting that the willingness of the courts in
England to excuse sailors from a strict adherence to their legal duties may have encouraged a lack of responsibility on the part of those the courts sought to help). Of
course, the competence explanation does not account for the Court's distinction between state and local governments. In general, the Court has been far less protective
of local than of state governments, despite the fact that many observers would agree
that the attorneys for local governments generally make less effective presentations to
the Court than their state counterparts.
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Intuitive Originalism
The Alden decision reveals a curious sort of commitment to

originalist interpretive premises. On the one hand, it appears quite
apparent that the Court's denial of access to a state forum for the
enforcement of federal statutory rights represents a working-out of
the implications of its decision in Seminole Tribe.63 On the other hand,
the Court repeatedly refers to the expectations of the framers of the
Constitution. But the Court relies not on any formal originalist inquiry; recall that it had previously admitted that the mere text of the
Eleventh Amendment would apply only to diverse-party litigation and
would not appear to apply to state courts at all. Instead, the Court
relied upon its own conception of how the framers would have likely
resolved the issue of access to state courts had it been presented to
them.
The relevant passage appears in a section of Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion that he nominally devotes to a consideration of "evidence of the original understanding of the Constitution." 6 4 He concludes his analysis of that understanding with the following passage:
In light of the historical record it is difficult to believe that the Constitution would have been adopted if it had been understood to
strip the States of immunity from suit in their own courts and cede
to the Federal Government a power to subject nonconsenting States
65
to private suits in these fora.
This remarkable passage-echoing a comment that Justice Kennedy made during oral argument 66 -proposes to base ajurisprudence
of original intention on the Justice's own intuitive reconstruction of
the framers' likely attitude toward an issue that did not arise during
debates over ratification. Whatever the relevance of the question to
the issue in Alden and whatever the propriety of such an approach to
originalism-and many originalists have steered away from reliance
on attempted reconstructions of the intent, real or imagined, of the
framers67 -the comment may reflect some lingering belief in the relevance of the historical record.
63 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2265 (characterizing as anomalous an interpretation of
immunity that would permit Congress to wield "greater power in the state courts than
in its own judicial instrumentalities").
64 IdL at 2260
65 Id. at 2261.
66 See Transcript of Oral Argument, 68 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. July 6, 1999) (quoting Justice Kennedy's assertion at oral argument to the effect that the framers were
unlikely to have contemplated the imposition of suits against states in state court).
67 See ROBERT H. BoP.t, THE TEMPTING OF AMERIcA 163 (1990) (rejecting notion
that the philosophy of originalism entails deciding cases the way the participants in
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Toward a Broader Inquiry into State Sovereign Immunity

Building on these possible accounts of the Court's decision to
broaden state sovereign immunity, one might develop areas of scholarly inquiry that may better explain and inform the Court's work in
the field. Whether any of these fields of inquiry will yield persuasive
insights remains, of course, quite problematic.
1.

Separation of Powers

Although many observers have identified state legislative control
of the fisc as a factor in Eleventh Amendment developments, 68 we still
await a detailed consideration of the influence of separation-of-powers
questions on state suability. In the beginning, public creditors sought
compensation by filing legislative petitions with the colonial assemblies, praying for an appropriation of funds to pay the debt in question. Legislators thus viewed claims processing as linked to the power
to tax and to spend and were jealous of any judicial pretensions in the
area. The rise of separation-of-powers thinking coupled with distrust
of all-powerful state assemblies led to the perception that courts might
more properly play this adjudicative function. By the time of the
framing, republican theory pointed pretty clearly toward the creation
69
of a judicial role.
The judicial role took some time to develop, depending as it did
on the legislative decision to create a mode through which individuals
might present their governmental claims to the courts. At least by the
past century, however, the judicial role was fairly well established.
Thus, both the state and federal governments had (for the most part)
created judicial machinery for the determination of contract claims
and had shifted responsibility for government torts from the individual officers to the state itself.70 As a consequence, private bils play a
less important role in routine determination of public claims as legislatures have come to rely upon the courts for adjudication and have
the ratifying conventions of the day would have done and acknowledging that the
ratifying conventions would likely split on any closely disputed question).
68 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821) (describing the
11th Amendment as a product of the Court's decision to uphold its jurisdiction over
claims against "greatly indebted" states).
69 See generally Pfander, supra note 50, at 929-45 (summarizing the shift from
legislative to judicial processing of claims against the state in post-Revolutionary
America).
70 See id. at 964-65 (sketching the history of the federal court of claims and of the
passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act); Pfander, An IntermediateSolution, supra note
21, at 205-08 (sketching the statutes in which the state legislatures permit state courts
to adjudicate claims against the states).
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adopted some, more or less, routine modes for the payment of any
71
judgments that the courts render.
With the growing reliance upon judicial modes, the function of
sovereign immunity may well have changed dramatically. During the
heyday of the legislative petition, sovereign immunity operated as a
barrier to judicial processing and served to assure legislative primacy
in the determination and payment of claims. Today, legislative assemblies may take the position that individuals should seek a judicial determination of the claims against the government and may not seek
private bill relief in the face ofjudicial denials. 72 The unavailability of
private bill relief suggests that the deployment of sovereign immunity
does not simply shift the forum for determination of the claim from
the courts to the legislative branch; it denies relief altogether. Indeed, the Alden decision makes sense only as an attempt to perfect the
immunity from money damages liability in state court litigation that
the Court understood itself to have conferred upon the states in Semi73
nole Tribe.
This separation-of-powers focus suggests that the Court in Alden
faced an issue of sovereign immunity that differed in functional terms
from those that had arisen during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, before routine reliance on judicial decisionmaking. The historical immunity of the sovereign in both its own courts and other
courts secured not a regime of non-liability, but rather a regime of
legislative primacy. (Article III's provision for the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction over suits brought against states by aliens and non-residents underscores this legislative primacy account; it assumes that residents, not outsiders, will receive fair treatment at the hands of their
own legislative assembly.) Today, the fact that Maine and other states
have exercised that primacy to create ajudicial mode of claims determination and payment makes it difficult to identify any affront to the
71 At the federal level, the Judgment Fund now provides for routine payment of
claims against the United States. See 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994). In Illinois, state law
provides for the routine payment of claims allowed by decision of the Illinois Court of
Claims, at least up to the amount of $5000. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/24 (West

1999).
72 Although private bill relief remains available for victims of government torts
who cannot recover under existing law, the shift to judicial processing of many such
claims has lessened its significance. See Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims
Against the United States: The Evolution from a Legislative Toward aJudicialModel of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625 (1985) (tracing the shift to judicial processing).
73 For the suggestion that the Court had intended to fashion such an immunity

all along and did not contemplate a shift to litigation in state courts, see Carlos Manuel V.zquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1722-26
(1997).

20001

ONCE

MORE

UNTO THE BREACH

forum sovereign from Congress's decision to rely upon the same
mode for the determination and payment of federal claims.
To be sure, some states may have retained full sovereign immunity and may continue to pass upon the claims of public creditors
through private bill processes.74 The existence of such a regime of
retained legislative claims processing could present difficult questions.
One might question whether Congress could constitutionally insist
upon judicial processing of claims that the state processes through
private bill. 75 Alternatively, one might doubt that the availability of
private bill processes could meet any relevant constitutional requirements of due process of law. 76 But such questions were quite remote
from the question the Court actually considered in Alden.
A separation-of-powers inquiry might also help to answer the Alden Court's concern with novelty. In the eighteenth-century world of
routine legislative processing of private bills, Congress would have no
occasion to prescribe a judicial mode for the assertion of claims
against the states in the states' own courts. But with this century's
growing reliance upon judicial modes for the enforcement of claims
against the fisc and the desuetude of the private bill practice, judicial
relief may represent the only game in town. The novelty of the Alden
decision may thus lie less in Congress's provision for a judicial mode
than in the Court's willingness to provide the state with a constitutional right to discriminate against the assertion of claims based upon
federal law. Such an outcome appears both novel and quite divorced
74 See, e.g., Pfander, An Intermediate Solution, supra note 22, at 206 n.166 (noting
that Texas and Vermont legislatures retain control over claims for breach of contract
against the state).
75 One can argue that this claim, not present in Alden due to the state of Maine's
shift to a judicial mode of claims determination, was squarely presented in another
petition. SeeJacoby v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 962 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1998) (holding
that Arkansas courts must entertain federal claim against the state despite the absence
of any provision for the adjudication of state law claims), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2387
(1999) (vacating and remanding in light of Alden).
76 Among the bedrock principles of American constitutionalism, due process has
long entailed a commitment to judicial process. SeeJuLius GOEBEL, JR., HiSTORY OF
Tm SUPREM COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at
101-02, 436 n.123 (1971) (arguing that the distinctive feature of the guarantee of due
process of law, as it appears in the Bill of Rights, was to securejudicial determination
of one's claim, in preference to a legislative determination). The Court's suggestion
that the states might discharge their due process obligations through legislative claims
processing rejects several centuries of Anglo-Americanjurisprudence. SeeFlorida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 n.9
(1999) (noting the availability of remedies both through private bill and through suit
to recover for a taking or a conversion).
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from any state interest in protecting the fisc from judicially determined liability.
2.

Understanding Agency Incentives

Just as we might benefit from a better understanding of the implications of the shift from legislative to judicial claims determination,
we need to focus attention on the incentives that agencies face in deciding how to allocate resources so as to minimize the likelihood of a
breach of state and federal law. Suppose that the agency in Maine
faced a budget shortfall and chose to underpay its employees in an
effort to shift the cost of overtime off its budget. A successful suit by
the employees might result in ultimate payment, not from the accounts of the breaching agency, but from the general revenue accounts of the state. Moreover, the burden of paying the attorney's
fees to defend the agency's misconduct might well fall upon the state's
attorney general and not on the agency itself. State agencies that have
no obligation to internalize the cost of their breaches will face, the
economists remind us, inadequate incentives to conform their con77
duct to the law.

We have had too little scholarship on the subject of how to structure liability and immunity incentives that will both keep government
agencies within the law and do so without overdeterring them from
conducting their official business.7 8 Interestingly, we may have to
look outside the world of sovereign immunity law for help, to those
who have examined government incentives from other perspectives.
We may well find that incentives that work well for, say, IRS agents do
77

Interestingly, the federal government has taken steps to prevent such skewed

agency incentives. The Judgment Fund, 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994), generally provides
for the payment ofjudgments against the United States and its officers (in their official capacities) from a standing appropriation of funds from the Treasury. Yet the law
requires agencies whose actions result in judgment for breach of contract to reimburse the Treasury out of the agency's own appropriated funds. Similarly, the law

calls for the payment of amounts to indemnify officers for judgments rendered
against them in their personal capacity (as in a Bivens action) from the agency's own
appropriation. See generally U.S. GEN. Acar. OFF., 3 PRINCIPLS OF FEDERAL AppROPRIATIONS LAW 14-15 to -24 (2d ed. 1994). The law's evident attempt to require federal
agencies to retain responsibility for the payment of at least some judgments resulting
from agency action, especially in the contract arena, helps to assure us that the agency

will not have budgetary incentives to violate the law as a way to shift certain costs to a
different pool of appropriated funds.

78 For notable attempts to understand agency incentives, see PETER SCHUCc, SU(1983), and Larry Kramer

ING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS

& Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987
Sup. CT. REv. 249.
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not work as well for local police officials.7 9 A remedial scheme for the
Fourth Amendment may need to take account of the law enforcement
context and may well differ from that needed to enforce other federal

rights. 8 0
One can find some evidence that the Court seeks to fashion such
a selective enforcement scheme. On the one hand, the Court has
held in a variety of recent decisions that, notwithstanding the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, the states themselves may owe a constitutional
obligation in certain circumstances to provide retrospective relief
against the state itself.81 Yet the Court has been careful to refrain
from creating any such generally applicable rule of entity liability for
relief in the nature of damages. By linking the states' obligation to
pay damages to specific constitutional provisions, the Court has preserved its ability to tailor the nature and potency of the required relief
to the particular constitutional violation in question. While such a
selective approach maximizes the Court's control over remedial potency, we have little reason to believe that the approach rests upon any
deep understanding of the manner in which its rules interact with
agency incentives within the particular fields. Certainly, one finds no
79 Tales of abuse at the hands of IRS agents gave rise to extensive congressional
hearings but little in the way of concrete change in liability rules. See, e.g., Seth Kaufman, IRS Restructuring andReform Act of 1998: Monopoly of Force,AdministrativeAccountability, andDue Process,58 ADMIN. L. Rv. 819 (1998) (describing the 1997 hearings into

IRS abuse and the eventual adoption of a statute that simply reduced the showing
required to recover damages under existing law from abusive agents). On the interplay of remedial schemes that apply to the work of the local constabulary, see Christopher Slobogin, Why LiberalsShould Chuck the ExclusionaryRu 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363
(considering a variety of remedial schemes to enforce rights under the Fourth
Amendment, including suits against officials for money damages and motions to invoke the exclusionary rule).
80 Interestingly, it was just such a call for particularized study of the details of
existing remedial schemes that then-Professor Scalia issued in his 1970 article on the
operation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity within the federal government. See
Scalia, supra note 1. Professor Scalia regarded some of the disparities in the doctrine's application as having resulted from historical accident and as defying any attempt at scholarly synthesis or generalization. See id. at 912-20 (arguing that the
Court's selective invocation of sovereign immunity as a bar to the judicial review of
federal government action reflects historic distinctions between various categories of
claims and not the working out of some broader principle of immunity).
81 See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994) (holding that the Due Process
Clause requires states to provide "meaningful backward-looking relief" when they purport to provide a postdeprivation remedy); McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic
Beverages, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990) (same); First English Evangelical Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that the Just Compensation Clause requires governments to provide a monetary remedy for a taking of property, notwithstanding sovereign immunity).
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evidence of empiricism, casual or otherwise, in the Court's selective
82
approach to entity liability.

3.

The Turn to Comparative Law

Constitutional law and federal courts scholars have turned with
increasing frequency to comparative research for new insights into the
operation of American federalism.8 3 Such a turn may make sense in
the realm of sovereign immunity. Indeed, during much the same period that the Supreme Court of the United States has fashioned bold
new rules of immunity in Seminole Tribe and Alden, the European
Court ofJustice (ECJ) has announced similarly importantjudge-made
changes in the law of member state judicial liability within the European Union. Yet in Europe, the ECJ has moved in precisely the opposite direction.
In Francovichv. Italy,8 4 the ECJ held that the member state courts

must entertain private suits against the state itself for damages resulting from the state's failure to discharge its duties under European law.
More than simply a decision to refrain from interposing ajudge-made
doctrine of sovereign immunity to block a right of action that the legislative body had put in place, Francovichinvoked unwritten structural
precepts much like those in Alden to support its creation of a judgemade right of action designed to secure member state compliance
with the harmonization law of Europe. Five years later, in Brasserie du
Pecheur/Factortame111,85 the ECJ refined and extended its Francovich
rule.8 6 The animating principle in Europe thus appears to be one of
broader member state accountability to the rules of the center, a prin82 See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,
2233 (Scalia, J.) (scornfully dismissing the dissent's pragmatic argument in favor of
legislative flexibility and its emphasis on the need to regulate states that chose to

participate in ordinary commercial activities).
83 See, e.g., VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw (1999); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 108 YALE

LJ. 1225 (1999).
84

1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.

85 Cases C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pacheur SA v. Germany, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029.
86 For commentary on Francovichand Brasserie,see Roberto Caranta, JudicialProtection Against Member States: A NewJus Commune Takes Shape, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
703 (1995), Roberto Caranta, Governmental Liability After Francovich, 52 CAMBRIDGE

L.J. 272 (1993), and Carol Harlow, Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State, 2
EUR. L.J. 199 (1996). For an economic approach to the standard of member state
liability that seeks to avoid over-deterrence, see Roger Van den Bergh & Hans-Bernd
Schdfer, State Liabilityfor Infringment of the EC Treaty: Economic Arguments in Support of a

Rule of "Obvious Negligence," 23 EUt.

L. REv. 552 (1998).
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ciple quite different from that which animates state immunity law in
the United States.
Of course, one has reason to predict that comparative work will
prove no more influential with the Alden majority than other scholarly
efforts in recent years. The attitude that Justice Scalia expressed toward such work-that the distinctive quality of American federalism
defies productive comparison to other federal governments-may
represent the views of the majority.8 7 But comparative work still offers

valuable descriptive insights into the Court's own conception of its
role in defending the states from an overreaching Congress.
IV. THE CONTRMUTIONS TO Tins SYMosiuM
Like many who have commented on Alden,"" the contributors to
the AALS panel discussion and this Symposium range in attitude from
the insouciant to the indignant. Two of the principal contributors,
Carlos VW.zquez and Ann Woolhandler, have previously articulated a
somewhat limited conception of the scope of congressional power to
impose suits upon the states and a corresponding openness to the
Court's new sovereign immunity jurisprudence.8 9 Both refine their
views here. In Old Property, New Property, and Sovereign Immunity,90 Professor Woolhandler describes her own reaction to Alden as of the "no
big deal" variety and goes on to propose a distinction between the
sorts of remedies needed to secure nineteenth and twentieth-century
property rights from state deprivation. 91 In Eleventh Amendment Schizo87 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.1l (1997) (dismissing the idea
that comparative analysis of the constitutions of European Union and the United
States might inform the interpretive process).
88 See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1011 (2000) (contrasting the highly critical view of Charles
Fried with the more sanguine assessment of Kathleen Sullivan). Professor Meltzer
nicely captures the range of reactions and suggests that, for reasons bound up with
the differing values of the two disciplines, those who teach federal courts may tend as
a group to view the decisions as more troubling than those who teach constitutional
law. See id.
89 See Carlos Manuel Vfzquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE
L.J. 1683 (1997); Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77 (1998).
90 Ann Woolhandler, Old Property, New Property, and Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. Rav. 919 (2000).
91 See id. Professor Woolhandler notes the willingness of the Court to fashion
fairly complete remedies for governmental invasions of "old property," but suggests
reasons why the Court might rightly take a less demanding approach to the creation
of remedies for similar violations of such "new property" rights as entitlements under
new federal regulatory statutes.
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phrenia,9 2 Professor Vizquez appears somewhat more concerned, acknowledging that strands of immunity rhetoric in the Court's
decisions may pose a more significant threat to the rule of law and
federal supremacy. Professor Jay Tidmarsh, in A DialogicDefense of Alden, also offers qualified support for the Court's latest work with an
93
interesting, dialogic approach to the decision.
Judge William Fletcher, who presented a principal paper at the
AALS panel discussion, and Professor VickiJackson, who offered comments at the panel and has expanded her contribution here, do not
appear so sanguine. 94 Although Judge Fletcher sees the Alden decision as supportable, he has a good many questions about Seminole
Tribe and about the Court's continuing distinction between fairly
broad immunity for state governments and fairly strict accountability
for local governments. He also raises an interesting doubt about the
durability of the Court's proposed distinction between Commerce
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment abrogation. ProfessorJackson remains quite critical of the Court's new direction, frankly calling upon
the Court to reverse itself and for scholars and other observers to
maintain the drumbeat of criticism that she hopes may speed the
eventual arrival of such a reversal. She also offers a detailed critique
of the work of Professors Vzquez and Woolhandler.
Daniel Meltzer also finds the recent decisions more difficult to
defend. In State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory,95
Professor Meltzer characterizes the Court's recent sovereign immunity
decisions as undertheorized, ineffectual, and counterproductive. 96
He thus concludes that they do not make up a coherent body of law
that will remain stable into the future. Either state sovereign immunity will continue to grow in significance as the Court attempts to protect its principle from congressional evasion, Professor Meltzer
believes, or the Court will change course and overrule the decisions in
Seminole Tribe and Alden. 97 Perhaps it is this instability thatjustifies the
92

Carlos Manuel Vftzquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia:, 75 NoTRE

DAME
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REv. 859 (2000).

93

See Jay Tidmarsh, A Dialogic Defense of Alden, 75 NoTRE DAME L.

REV.

1161

(2000).
94 See William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 843 (2000); Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional
Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 953 (2000).
95 Meltzer, supra note 88, at 1011.
96 See id. at 1011, 1052.
97 See id. at 1054.
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dissent's invocation of the ghost of Lochner to describe the majority's
nascent and growing immunity doctrine.
Many contributors to this Symposium share Professor Meltzer's
concern with the Court's analytical technique and his emphasis on the
narrowness of the current five-Justice majority whose views have controlled the outcome of recent cases. In Pledging a New Allegiance: An
Essay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism,98 Daniel Farber describes
the Court's recent round of decisions as driven by a conception of
state sovereignty that ignores "conventional legal arguments" and expresses, at most, half-hearted concern with functional considerations.
John Orth shares Professor Farber's poor opinion of the Court's technique, focusing in particular on the Court's attempt to invoke an official history, "authoritatively laid down from on high and no longer
open to question."9 9 In State Immunity, PoliticalAccountability, and Alden v. Maine, 10 0 William Marshall and Jason Cowart consider the
Court's novel emphasis on political accountability as an interesting,
but ultimately inadequate, justification for its expansion of immunity.
John Nowak goes Farber and Orth one better in The Gang ofFive & the
Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court'0 1-a candid,
broad-ranging, and thoroughly unreconstructed criticism of the fiveJustice majority. Professor Nowak, like Suzanna Sherry in States Are
People Too,10 2 hears an echo from the nineteenth century in the Rehnquist Court's new state sovereign immunity decisions. For Professor
Nowak, the echo comes from the hostility to minority race persons
that led to nineteenth-century decisions dismantling Reconstruction.
For Professor Sherry, recent decisions conferring a dignitary status on
states resemble those that led to personhood for corporations over
one hundred years ago.
Underlying these criticisms of technique and outcome, one finds
a widespread concern with the question of why this Court has chosen
to invigorate the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Professor
Meltzer offers a variety of possible and interlocking explanations, including the Court's doubts as to the efficacy of the political safeguards
of federalism, its resistance to what it views as congressional efforts to
98 Daniel Farber, Pledginga New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133 (2000).
99 John V. Orth, History and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1147
(2000).
100 William Marshall &Jason Cowart, State Immunity, PoliticalAccountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1069 (2000).
101 John Nowak, The Gang of Five & the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction
Supreme Court, 75 NoT DAME L. RErv. 1091 (2000).
102 Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1121 (2000).
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circumvent prior rulings limiting national power, and its attraction to
sovereign immunity as a seemingly more determinate and less resultoriented approach to protecting state autonomy than, for example,
the approach of NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery. Professor Farber offers a somewhat different take, portraying the Court as subscribing to
a constitutional faith or credo that includes allegiance to and veneration of state governments and their role in the federal system. For
Farber, this somewhat emotional constitutional faith explains why the
Court has remained unrepentant in the face of what he clearly regards as cogent scholarly criticism. Professor Nowak offers a less charitable account, characterizing the Court as motivated by hostility to
the rights of minorities and by a desire to weaken the national role in
the protection of civil rights.
Despite the depth of feeling that underlies these criticisms of the
Court's work, for me the singular feature of recent Eleventh Amendment scholarship has been its tendency to justify, rather than to condemn, the Court's expansion of state sovereign immunity. Scholars
no longer speak with a single voice in criticizing the Court's immunity
doctrine. In addition to the thoughtful contributions of Professors
Vdzquez, Woolhandler, and Tidmarsh to this Symposium, John Jeffries has written two pieces that offer qualified praise of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.10 3 Other symposia include papers that find at
least something to like in the recent expansion of state sovereign
immunity.
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All of these defenses of the doctrine of sovereign immunity suggest that the world may have evolved a bit in the thirty years since
Professor Scalia taught us the lesson of the Court's imperviousness to
the professorial criticism of judge-made immunity law. To be sure,
the Justice wrote of federal sovereign immunity, a question that does
not present the federalism issues that arise in connection with suits
brought against the states. No doubt scholars who defend the Court's
decision in Alden do so as part of a considered defense of the role of
the states in our system of government. But recent scholarship suggests that the academy may have wised up a bit; maybe we've grown
tired of being ignored.

103 SeeJeffries, supra note 9, at 47; Jeffries, supra note 45.
104 See Ann Althouse, The Alden Tiogy: Still Searchingfor a Way to Enforce Federalism,
52 RuTGERS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000); Michael Wells, Suing Statesfor Money: Consti-
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